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ABSTRACT This paper presents the cryptanalysis of optical ciphers combining double random phase
encoding with permutation techniques, and shows its vulnerability against plaintext attack regardless of the
implementation order of the two procedures. The equivalent secret keys of both the combination fashions can
be retrieved, instead of the recovery of random phase masks and permutation matrix. Numerical simulations
are also given for validation.
INDEX TERMS Double random phase encoding, optical ciphers, image permutation, cryptanalysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decades, the inherent parallelism superiority has
promoted the developments of optical information process-
ing techniques. Among them, double random phase encod-
ing (DRPE), which is used to protect confidentiality of
images by transforming them into stationarywhite noises, has
paved the way for numerous types of optical security schemes
since its appearance in [1]. Originating from the intrinsic
linearity feature, DRPE is demonstrated to be vulnerable
against various attacks, such as chosen-ciphertext attack [2],
known-plaintext attack [3], chosen-plaintext attack [4], and
some of its enhancements have also been broken [5]–[7].
For security improvements, permutation techniques, such
as Jigsaw transform [8], Chirikov standard map [9], and
chaotic Baker map [10], [11] have been introduced to com-
bine with DRPE to build secure cascaded cryptosystems.
There are two integration fashions. The first type uses a
preprocessing scrambling before DRPE (permutation-then-
DRPE, abbreviated as PD), a typical scheme is proposed
in [10]. The latter pattern is to adopt a rear-mounted permuta-
tion procedure (DRPE-then-permutation, abbreviated as DP),
a representative design can be found in [11]. Cryptanaly-
sis of the first type cascaded system has been investigated
in [11], [12], whereas the vulnerability of DP scheme has
not been proposed. In this work, we will give a general
cryptanalysis of the optical ciphers combining DRPE with
permutation technique, no matter what’s the order of the two
procedures.
This study differs from the previous achievement [12],
which only presents the chosen-plaintext attack for PD
scheme, in that we demonstrate a generalized cryptanalysis
of both the PD and DP cryptosystems and give an effective
plaintext attack for both types of the combined systems.
In other words, this work can be viewed as an extension
of [12], not only in theoretical analysis but also in the uni-
versality for breaking the cascaded systems. The proposed
achievement is a generalized cryptanalysis of the encryption
systems combining DRPE with permutation, no matter how
complex the permutation technique is and what the imple-
mentation order of the two procedures. Our contributions
can be summarized as following: 1) the equivalent form of
DRPE is deduced out, the linearity and vulnerability of DRPE
is intuitively exposed; 2) cryptanalysis shows that both the
combined systems can be viewed as linear encoding schemes,
whose equivalent encryption matrices are also given; 3) the
unitary of the equivalent encryption matrices are proved,
which relax the decryption/breaking of the crytposystems
to a matrix conjunction-then-multiplication operation rather
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FIGURE 1. Pricinple of double random phase encoding.
than the recovery of the permutation matrix as well as the
random phase masks. The proposed achievements reveal that
the security of such combined systems cannot be improved
by developing more complex permutation approaches, or
adjusting the implementation order of DRPE and permutation
procedures.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
combined cryptosystems and theoretical preliminaries are
given in section II, while the cryptanalysis is described
in detail in section III. Experimental results is presented
in section IV. Finally, conclusions will be drawn in the last
section.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let us start with the baisc principle of DRPE. It is based
on 4f optical system to encrypt the plaintext into stationary
white noise. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the primary image X
is immediately followed by a random phase mask R1, they
are placed in the object plane of the first lens. Then in the
focal plane of this lens, the Fourier transform (FT) of the
product X · R1, is obtained. This product is subsequently
multiplied by the second random phase maskR2, and then be
converted to spatial domain by the second lens. The encryp-
tion and decryption processes can be respectively written
as Eqs. (1) and (2), where ∗ represents the conjugation,
F denotes the two-dimensional Discrete Fourier Transform
(2D DFT) and F−1 is the two-dimensional inverse Discrete
Fourier transform (2D IDFT). The random phase masks R1
and R2 serve as the secret key.
C = F−1(R2 · F(X · R1)). (1)
X = F−1(F(C) · R2∗) · R1∗. (2)
Without loss of generality, P is denoted as the scrambling
transformation. Figure 2(a) sums up the encryption opera-
tions of PD scheme, while Fig. 2(b) demonstrates that of the
DP cryptosystem. Taking Eq. (1) into consideration, we can
subsequently obtain the outputs of PD and DP, as shown in
Eqs. (3) and (4), respectively.
CPD = F−1(R2 · F(P(X) · R1)). (3)
CDP = P(F−1(R2 · F(X · R1))). (4)
FIGURE 2. The combinations fashions of DRPE and permutation:
(a) PD architecture; (b) DP architecture.
Theoretical preliminaries regarding Fourier transform and
Kronecker product are required for the cryptanalysis. The
descriptions or proofs of the subsequent theoretical pre-
liminaries are either straight-forward or can be found
in [13], [14], and hence not presented here.
Definition 1: The FN is defined as the Fourier matrix
which can convert the DFT of a length−N signal through
matrix multiplication, i.e., DFT (x) = FN x. The formula of
FN is described in Eq. (5), where w = e−2pi i/N is a primitive
N th root of unity.
FN = 1√
N
×

1 1 1 1 · · · 1
1 w w2 w3 · · · wN−1
1 w2 w4 w6 · · · w2(N−1)
1 w3 w6 w9 · · · w3(N−1)
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 wN−1 w2(N−1) w3(N−1) w(N−1)(N−1)

.
Property 1: Both of the Fourier matrix FN and its
conjugate transpose FHN are symmetric and unitary, i.e.,
Eqs. (5) and (6) always hold.
FN = FTN . (5)
F−1N = FHN = FHTN . (6)
Theorem 1: With the definition of Fourier matrix, the
2D M × N DFT and IDFT can be respectively described
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as Eqs. (7) and (8).
F(PM×N ) = FMPM×NFN . (7)
F−1(PM×N ) = FHMPM×NFHN . (8)
Property 2: Denote X and R be M×N matrices, and ‘vec’
command as the vectorization operation to reshape a matrix
to a vector by stacking its columns, it is found that Eq. (9)
always holds, where diag(vec(R)) is the diagonal matrix with
entries are the sequential components of vec(R).
vec(X · R) = vec(R · X ) = diag(vec(R))vec(X ). (9)
Definition 2: If A is an M × N matrix and B is a P × Q
matrix, then the Kronecker product A ⊗ B is an MP × NQ
block matrix:
A⊗ B =
 a1,1B · · · a1,NB... . . . ...
aM ,1B · · · aM ,NB
 . (10)
Property 3: (A⊗ B)H = AH ⊗ BH .
Property 4: (A⊗ B)(C ⊗ D) = (AC)⊗ (BD).
Theorem 2: Assume that C = AXB, it has vec(C) =
vec(AXB) = (BT ⊗ A)vec(X ).
III. CRYPTANALYSIS
The equivalent of DRPE has to be deduced firstly. In the
following, we consider DRPE from the vector point of view.
The lowercase letter x is reserved as the corresponding
vector of the matrix X by stacking its columns. Taking
Eqs. (7) and (8) into Eq. (1), we obtain
C = FHM (R2 · FM (X · R1)FN )FHN .
Considering Theorem 2, we can get
vec(C) = vec(FHM (R2 · FM (X · R1)FN )FHN )
= (FHTN ⊗ FHM )vec(R2 · FM (X · R1)FN ).
And then, taking Properties 1 and 2 into consideration,
vec(C) = (FHTN ⊗ FHM )vec(R2 · FM (X · R1)FN )
= (FHN ⊗ FHM )diag(vec(R2))vec(FM (X · R1)FN ).
Employing Theorems 1 and 2 and Properties 2 and 3 further,
we can obtain
vec(C)
= (FHN ⊗ FHM )diag(vec(R2))vec(FM (X · R1)FN )
= (FHN ⊗ FHM )diag(vec(R2))(FTN ⊗ FM )vec(X · R1)
= (FHN ⊗FHM )diag(vec(R2))(FTN⊗FM )diag(vec(R1))vec(X )
= (FN ⊗ FM )Hdiag(vec(R2))(FN ⊗ FM )
×diag(vec(R1))vec(X ).
Here, the equivalent of DRPE is obtained, as demonstrated
in Eq. (11), where F is the Kronecker product of FN and FM ,
R1 = diag(vec(R1)), R2 = diag(vec(R2)), and T is adopted
as the product of FHR2FR1, respectively. They are all with
sizeMN ×MN , whereas the size of the input X isM×N and
will be vectorized to x with size MN × 1.
c = vec(C) = FHR2FR1x = Tx. (11)
Generally, the random scrambling operation is given as a
permutation matrix whose size is identical with the primary
image, and its particle is a 2D pixel coordinate denotes the
scrambled position in the permuted image, as the preferred
case in [11], [15], and [16]. On the contrary, the permutation
operation is treated from the vector point of view in this work.
In this circumstance, the permutation is implemented to a
length-MN vector x rather than M × N matrix X . The per-
mutation matrix is regarded as a uniform randomMN ×MN
permutation matrix, with ‘1’ occurring once and only once
in each row and column and all other entries are ‘0’. It can
be regarded as the random arrangement of the rows/columns
of MN × MN identity matrix. Referring to the deduction
above, we can draw the ciphertexts of PD and DP schemes
in Eqs. (12) and (13), respectively. Accordingly, the products
TP andPT can be respectively regarded as the equivalent keys
of the PD and DP encryption schemes.
cPD = vec(CPD) = FHR2FR1Px = TPx (12)
cDP = vec(CDP) = PFHR2FR1x = PTx (13)
Here, one can draw the conclusion that MN pairs of
chosen-plaintexts are sufficient to retrieve the equivalent
secret keys, i.e., TP and PT , no matter how complex the per-
mutation is and what the implementation sequence of the two
procedures. In practice, the attack can be launched usingMN
independent plaintexts, i.e., xi = {x1, x2, · · · , xi, · · · , xMN }.
For example, xi can be one column of theMN ×MN identity
matrix, and its ciphertext yi is therefore the corresponding
column of the equivalent keys. After the extraction of the
equivalent matrix key TP or PT , their inverse could be used
for recovering any ciphertexts which are produced with the
same secret key.
It can be further proved that both TP and PT are unitary
matrices, so that the expensive matrix inversion reduces to
the simple conjugate transpose operation.
The unitarity of T is proofed at first. As descried before,
T = FHR2FR1, where F is the Kronecker product of FN
and FM . Based on Properties 3 and 4, we obtain
FFH = (FN ⊗ FM )(FN ⊗ FM )H
= (FN ⊗ FM )(FHN ⊗ FHM )
= (FNFHN )⊗ (FMFHM )
= I ⊗ I = I .
That means F is unitary. Considering R1 and R2 are built
by phase-only matrices, and hence are unitary, we can conse-
quently obtain
TTH = (FHR2FR1)(FHR2FR1)H = I .
Therefore, T is proved as a unitary matrix. Moreover, it is
always true that further permuting a shuffled sequence Px
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with PT will re-produce the original sequence x. In light of
these observations, it is readily to concluded that TP and PT
are both unitary.
With the extraction of the equivalent keys, i.e., one has
obtained the product of TP or PT by plaintext attack,
only a conjunction-then-multiplication operation is suffi-
cient to recover the plaintext. It is un-necessary, if it is not
unable, to retrieve the permutation matrix P and the DRPE
equivalent key T , respectively. The recovery of the plain-
text can be straightforward implemented, as illustrated in
Eqs. (14) and (15), for PD and DP schemes, respectively.
x = vec(X ) = (TP)−1cDP = (TP)HcPD (14)
x = vec(X ) = (PT )−1cPD = (PT )HcDP (15)
We can come to the conclusion that, both of the PD and DP
encryption schemes are vulnerable against chosen-plaintext
attack, and the number of the required plaintexts is MN .
Besides, referring to the coupon collector problem [17], there
existMN independent plaintexts in the collection ofO(MN×
logMN ) plaintexts with large probability, i.e., the data com-
plexity of this known-plaintext attack is O(MN × logMN ).
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
To validate the above cryptanalysis, numbers of numerical
simulations have been carried out to crack the typical PD
scheme proposed by Elshamy [10] and the representative
DP cryptosystem in [11]. The same secret key, i.e., identical
phase masks and Baker map parameters are adopted in both
the systems. The encryption algorithms and cryptanalyzing
operations are implemented on Matlab R2010a platform,
using a personal computer with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 CPU
(3.2GHZ), 16GB memory and 1TB hard-disk capacity. The
result presented here is just a demonstration of the effec-
tiveness, it is straightforward to extend the cryptanalysis to
various encryption scenarios with the source codes openly
accessible at https://sites.google.com/site/leoyuzhang/.
The gray-scale peppers image with size of 256 × 256
is employed for validation, shown in Figs. 3(a) and 4(a).
The effectiveness of the proposed cryptanalysis for
PD scheme [10] is demonstrated in Fig. 3, where
Figs. 3(b) and 3(c) are the amplitude and phase of the
ciphertext, respectively.
As can be observed, the ciphertexts are noisy-like and does
not release any useful information of the plaintext. We then
FIGURE 3. Simulation results of PD scheme: (a) plaintext peppers;
(b) amplitude of the ciphertext using PD scheme [10]; (c) phase of the
ciphertext using PD scheme [10]; (d) the recovered image using the
chosen-plaintext attack.
lanuch the chosen-plaintext attack to extract the equivalent
encryption matrix, partly demonstrated in Eq. (16), as shown
at the bottom of this page. As analyzed above, this encryption
matrix is a product of the permutation matrix and the ran-
dom phase masks. Generally, it is unable to decompose the
matrix to recover the precise knowledge of the permutation
matrix and random phase masks, and it is not necessary
to do this. The proved unitarity of the encryption matrix
relaxes the decryption process to a matrix conjunction-then-
multiplication operation, as shown in Eqs. (14) and (15),
for PD and DP schemes, respectively. With this method,
the plaintext is subsequently correctly recovered, as shown
in Fig. 3(d).
The simulation results when cryptanalyzingDP scheme are
given in Fig. 4, and Eq. (17), as shown at the bottom of this
page, is the retrieved equivalent matrix using the proposed
attack. It is obvious that the equivalent secret keys are differ-
ent even though using identical phase masks and permutation
matrix, i.e., different implementation orders brings distinct
ciphertexts.
The recovered image with the retrieved keys is shown
in Fig. 4(d). Numerical analysis proves that both the
KeyPD = TP = 1256

−1.256+ 0.321i 0.834+ 0.986i · · · 0.522+ 0.337i
−0.049− 0.121i −0.302− 0.175i · · · −0.409+ 0.049i
...
...
. . .
...
0.511− 0.081i 0.048− 1.099i · · · 0.601− 0.117i
 (16)
KeyDP = PT = 1256

0.206+ 0.291i −0.588+ 0.866i · · · 0.897+ 0.728i
−1.451− 0.089i 0.136− 1.040i · · · −0.503+ 0.129i
...
...
. . .
...
0.071+ 0.674i −0.621+ 1.034i · · · −0.639+ 0.141i
 (17)
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FIGURE 4. Simulation results of DP scheme: (a) plaintext peppers;
(b) amplitude of the ciphertext using DP scheme [11]; (c) phase of the
ciphertext using DP scheme [11]; (d) the recovered image using the
chosen-plaintext attack.
recovered images are consistent with the plaintext, and there-
fore validate the effectiveness of the proposed attack.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we have demonstrated that encryption schemes
combining DRPE with permutation technique are vulnera-
ble against plaintext attack regardless of the implementation
order. From the vector point of view, both of the two tech-
niques can be regarded as linear transforms. They cannot
enhance the security for each other, the vulnerability origi-
nates from the intrinsic linear property.
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